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STRETCHING THE LIMITS OF DEAL PROTECTION
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Eleonora Gerasimchuk*
While I don't suggest that you rip the Omnicare pages out of your
notebook . . . . I do suggest that there's the possibility, one could
argue, that the decision has the life expectancy of a fruit fly.
- Justice Steele'
[I]t's really not my place to note this, but Omnicare is of
questionable continued vitality.
- Vice Chancellor Lamb in
Optima International of Miami, Inc. v. WCI Steel, Inc. 2
INTRODUCTION
J.P. Morgan's government-supported acquisition of Bear Steams
and Wells Fargo's acquisition of Wachovia stretched3 the limits of deal
* LL.M. in Banking, Corporate and Finance Law, Fordham University School of
Law, 2009; Dr. iur., University of Hamburg, 2005; Diploma in law, Lomonosov
Moscow State University, 2002. I thank Professor Richard Squire and Professor Sean
Griffith, who taught me corporate law at Fordham.
1. See David Marcus, Man of Steele, D&O ADVISOR, Sept. 2004, at 16.
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 127, Optima Int'l of Miami, Inc. v. WCI Steel,
Inc., C.A. No. 3833-VCL (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008), available at http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/files/-0702120713_001 .pdf [hereinafter Optima
Transcript]. There is no opinion in this case. Due to the time-sensitive nature of the
proceeding, Vice Chancellor Lamb ruled from the bench.
3. Professor Steven M. Davidoff wrote the following in his posting to The
Harvard Corporate Governance Blog:
From Bear to AIG to Wachovia, dealmakers have been pushing and testing the limits
of deal protection devices to lock-up these government sponsored deals safe in the
assumption that Delaware is unlikely to intervene .... [I]t remains to be seen how
this stretching will affect how deals are done outside the government sphere, and how
Delaware's jurisprudence will respond to the use of more circumscribing lock-ups in
ordinary course deals. For those who subscribe to the theory that Delaware's
jurisprudence is a thaumatrope--oscillating between strictness and laxity depending
upon the times-Delaware is likely to tolerate these lock-ups for the time being as
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protection devices as articulated by the Delaware Supreme Court in
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare.4 In Omnicare, Delaware's highest court
held that, where the deal protection devices make an alternative deal a
"fait accompli,'' 5 they are invalid under the Unocal6 standard. These
developments in deals struck amidst the financial crisis support the
continuing tendency to reject the Omnicare ruling more broadly. This
Essay describes the steps in the process of "[t]he [1]ong, [s]low [d]eath
of Omnicare"' and argues that these are the steps in the right direction.
Part I contains a short overview of different types of deal protection
devices used in corporate acquisitions, explains the reasons for their use
and puts them into the context of directors' fiduciary duties. Part II
describes the limits on deal protection devices as they were set by the
Omnicare decision. Part III analyzes the decisions of courts in Delaware
and other states rendered after Omnicare, which have loosened the
Omnicare restrictions on deal protection devices. Part IV concludes.
I. DEAL PROTECTION DEVICES IN CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
The essence of any deal protection device is to lock up a signed
deal and allow it to close as planned. A deal protection device should
either prevent the target from taking any steps that would encourage
another bidder to come forward with a competing offer or shield the
signed deal against a negative shareholder vote.8
necessary to the preservation of our capital markets system. The truth remains to be
seen.
Posting of Steven Davidoff to The Harvard Corporate Governance Blog,
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov (Dec. 6, 2008, 12:42 EST). The title of this Essay
should be understood in the sense of "loosening the restrictions on deal protection
devices" as they were set by the Omnicare decision, and not in the sense of further
broadening the Omnicare holding and applying its restrictions on a wider basis. Since
the idea of this Essay originated in Professor Davidoff's commentary, I have decided to
retain Professor Davidoff's wording, although the title is somewhat ambiguous.
4. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
5. Id. at 936.
6. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
7. See Posting of Professor Davidoff to DealBook Blog, http://dealbook.blogs.ny
times.com/2008/08/28/the-long-slow-death-of-omnicare (Aug. 28, 2008, 16:22 EST).
8. Only the effect of deal protection devices on the target is relevant for the
purposes of this Essay. The merger agreement can include deal protection provisions
aiming at preventing the acquirer from failing to consummate the deal, e.g. reverse
termination fees, specific performance provisions for the buyer, etc. However, the
dynamics and incentives of such acquirer-directed deal protections are different from
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A. Reasons for Protecting the Deal in the
Context of Corporate Acquisitions
Fostering deal certainty offers advantages for both acquirer and
target. Without some form of protection, the original bidder might
reasonably fear that its offer will simply be used as a "stalking horse" 9 to
secure a better offer and that it might eventually lose the deal in a future
bidding war. If the deal is not completed, the initial bidder may suffer a
decrease in its own stock price and may be viewed as weak in the market
for corporate control.' 0
The main incentive for a bidder to incorporate deal protection
devices is to reduce the actual and indirect costs associated with the
merger process, including opportunity costs arising from focusing on the
potential merger at hand.1" If the possibility of interference in the
merger plans is minimized, the acquirer will more readily risk the
significant costs associated with a bid, including advisory fees, loan
commitments, research and diligence costs, management time, and
foregone business opportunities. 12  When the acquirer invests its
resources in evaluating and purchasing a particular target company, it
must "abjure other valuable opportunities while negotiating or awaiting
the closing of a deal." '13 If the target decides to walk away from the
deal, leaving the initial bidder without a merger partner, it may be too
the target-directed deal protection devices. Rival companies are rarely seen attempting
to outbid the target by offering themselves to the acquirer for a lower price. In addition,
the courts are generally concerned about protecting target shareholders from losing an
opportunity to receive a control premium for their shares due to a decision of the board.
Cf Thanos Panagopoulos, Thinking Inside the Box: Analyzing Judicial Scrutiny of Deal
Protection Devices in Delaware, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 437, 443-44 (2006).
9. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 866 (Del. 1985).
10. See Guhan Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon
Transactions, 28 J. CORP. L. 691, 701-02 (2003).
11. See Brazen v. Bell At. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 45 (Del. 1997). See also Gregory
V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Process Based Model for Analyzing Deal Protection
Measures, 55 Bus. LAW. 1609, 1611-12 (2000).
12. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1178 (1981).
See also Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71
FoRDHAM L. REv. 1899, 1900 (2003).
13. A. Gilchrist Sparks III et al., Corporate Deal Protection-The Lay of the Land
in Delaware, in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL: CURRENT OFFENSIVE &
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES IN M&A TRANSACTIONS 401, 404 (1351 PLI/CORP. 2003).
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late for the bidder to seize those opportunities it originally possessed. 14
Another hidden cost is the economic effect associated with the acquirer
losing a deal within its grasp. The company may receive negative
publicity and appear to be in a weakened market position, especially if
the competing merger is well received by the capital markets. 1"
In addition, there is a free-rider problem: future bidders can rely
upon the terms of the first transaction and make certain assumptions
about what the first bidder turned up in its investigation of the
company. 16  Simple fairness requires that the first bidder is able to
protect its due diligence efforts.
"[T]argets have reasons of their own for avoiding non-binding
merger agreements. A particular merger may present unique business
opportunities or 'synergies' for the target that an intervening financial
bidder cannot match."' 7 The target board may "see unique benefits from
the favored transaction that the target's shareholders may not
recognize ... 18 Also, there are increased costs for the target involved
in a bidding war, which can be avoided by protecting the deal with the
favored bidder from an interloper.
B. Examples of Deal Protection Devices
Deal protection devices used in corporate acquisitions may be
grouped into three categories: (i) compensatory devices, examples of
which are termination fees and stock and asset options; (ii) voting
protections, such as voting agreements and "force-the-vote" provisions;
and (iii) exclusivity measures, for example no-shop and no-talk
provisions and matching rights.' 9
14. See Heath Price Tarbert, Merger Breakup Fees: A Critical Challenge to Anglo-
American Corporate Law, 34 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 627, 633 (2003).
15. See id.
16. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in
Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1982).
17. See Griffith, supra note 12, at 1900-01.
18. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BuSINESS ORGANIZATION 582 (2d ed. 2007). Courts reject this justification for deal
protection devices in transactions that trigger Revlon duties. In a Revlon transaction, the
board has no legitimate interests in protecting a deal from an informed shareholder vote.
19. In this section, I discuss classic deal protection devices. Other forms of
contracts can have a lockup effect. For example, the sale of one million Trans Union
shares to Pritzker in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), was a
compensatory device similar to a termination fee. If Trans Union was sold to another
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1. Termination Fees
A termination fee is a payment to the acquirer in the event the target
fails to close the transaction. 20  The triggers can be a changed board
recommendation, a negative shareholder vote or the closing of an
alternative transaction. A termination fee paid by the target to the jilted
acquirer is effectively borne by the winning bidder.
There is no magic number for a reasonable termination fee. Courts
will consider all factors,
including without limitation: the overall size of the termination fee,
as well as its percentage value; the benefit to shareholders, including
a premium (if any) that directors seek to protect; the absolute size of
the transaction, as well as the relative size of the partners to the
merger; the degree to which a counterparty found such protections to
be crucial to the deal, bearing in mind differences in bargaining
power; and the preclusive or coercive power of all deal protections
included in a transaction, taken as a whole.
2 1
Appropriate termination fees defy categorical rules: it is wrong to
say that "fees lower than 3% are always reasonable, 22 and at the
opposite side of the spectrum, there are "preclusive differences
23
between termination fees that count in billions rather than in millions.
Termination fees in the range of 3-4% of the purchase price are
generally believed to present an easily rationalized means to assure the
first bidder will recover its transaction expenses, including opportunity
costs, if the favored contract does not close. There have been
indications that courts will disapprove the amount of the termination fee
significantly outside of this range.24
bidder, the new acquirer would be forced to buy these shares.
20. Terms "break-up fees" and "topping fees" are also used. A topping fee is paid
if the target accepts another bidder's offer, whereas a break-up fee can be paid in the
event that the target simply walks away from the deal, not necessarily to another bidder.
A topping fee is usually structured in such a way that the target is required to pay a
negotiated percentage of the amount by which the subsequent offeror's bid exceeds the
original bid. See, e.g., CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422,
436 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
21. La. Mun. Police Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 (Del.
Ch. 2007).
22. In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1022 (Del. Ch. 2005).
23. Id. at 1022 n.79.
24. In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Consolidated Civil
Action No. 17383, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999), the court
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2. Stock and Asset Options
A stock option is a right granted to the acquirer to buy a block of
target's stock at a strike price. An asset option creates a right to acquire
specified corporate assets of the target. As with termination fees,
options can become exercisable after a changed board recommendation,
a negative shareholder vote or the closing of an alternative acquisition;
the cost of stock and asset options exercised by the jilted acquirer are
effectively borne by the winning bidder.
The amount of a reasonable stock option is not predetermined. In
deciding whether a stock option satisfies the reasonableness test, courts
will look at its percentage25 and absolute size.26 Stock options have
virtually disappeared after the elimination of pooling-of-interest
accounting in 2001.7
Courts have traditionally been more suspicious of asset options for
a target's key assets (so-called "crown jewel lockup[s] ' ' 28) than they are
of stock options. Asset options have been virtually non-existent since
Revlon2 9 and Mills Acquisition v. Macmillan.30
3. Voting Agreements and "Force-the-Vote" Provisions
A voting agreement is an agreement between the acquirer and a
target's shareholder by which the shareholder undertakes to approve the
merger. Understandably, the acquirer is mostly interested in commit-
ments from significant shareholders in order to ensure a majority vote.
A "force-the-vote" provision in the merger agreement requires the
stated in dicta that "6.3 percent certainly seems to stretch the definition of range of
reasonableness and probably stretches the definition beyond its breaking point."
25. In Rand v. W Air Lines, Inc., C.A. No. 8632, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26, at *8
(Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1994), affd, 659 A.2d 228 (Del. 1995), the Delaware Chancery
Court upheld a stock option of approximately 30% granted to the initial bidder.
26. In Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 39
(Del. 1994), the Delaware Supreme Court disallowed a stock option of 19.9% with a
large absolute size.
27. SeeALLEN ET AL., supra note 18, at 581-82.
28. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 (Del.
1989).
29. See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1986).
30. In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated an asset option for a target
division. See id. at 175-76. Similarly, in Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1284, an
option to purchase target subsidiaries was struck down.
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target board to submit the merger agreement for a shareholder vote, even
if the target board no longer recommends it.3' A voting agreement com-
bined with a "force-the-vote" provision in the merger agreement is a
strong deal protection.
4. No-Shops and No-Talks
Under a no-shop provision in the merger agreement the target board
undertakes not to actively solicit alternative proposals.
A no-shop provision can be further restricted by a no-talk
obligation, where the target is prohibited from even talking to
unsolicited bidders. Courts have condemned no-talk provisions as "the
legal equivalent of willful blindness.,3 2  Courts will uphold no-shop
provisions where they "do not foreclose other offers, but operate merely
to afford some protection to prevent disruption of the agreement by
proposals from third parties that are neither bona fide nor likely to result
in a higher transaction."33
No-talk provisions impede the flow of information between targets
and their would-be bidders, thereby creating an "information asym-
metry"34 to the benefit of the first bidder. Sometimes strict no-talk
provisions are regarded as problematic because they prevent the board
from meeting its duty to make an "informed judgment., 35 In other cases
challenges to no-talk provisions are rejected.36
31. "Force-the-vote" provisions were developed in practice after an amendment to
Section 251(c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law in 1998 had reduced the
impact of the board recommendation as an exclusivity measure. Before this
amendment, Section 251(c) was interpreted as precluding a shareholder vote if the
board of directors decided no longer to recommend the merger. See Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 887-88, 890 (Del. 1985).
32. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Consolidated Civil Action
No. 17383, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999).
33. Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280, 291 (Del.
Ch. 1998).
34. Griffith, supra note 12, at 1930.
35. Phelps Dodge Corp., 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *4.
36. See In re IXC Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., Consolidated C.A. No.
17324, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210, at **16-17 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999).
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5. Matching Rights
A matching right operates as a "last look"37 provision. The acquirer
has the right to match a superior bid, usually within a specified period of
time. Knowing that, an interloper will most likely not bid at all.
C. Deal Protection Devices and Directors 'Fiduciary Duties
The inclusion of deal protection devices into a merger agreement
leads to an inherent tension.38 The target company's board owes
fiduciary duties to the company shareholders. These fiduciary
obligations may constrain the board's ability to agree to limit its conduct
in the manner that the bidder demands under the terms of the deal
protection device the bidder proposes to include in the parties'
acquisition agreement.
Under Delaware law, the business and affairs of a Delaware
corporation are managed by, or under the direction of, a board of
directors.39 This responsibility "carries with it certain fundamental
fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders. 40  The
core duties are those of due care and loyalty; in addition, the directors
must act in good faith.41 The duty of care requires the directors to act
with "that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men
would use in similar circumstances. 42  This means there must be a
"good faith effort to be informed and to exercise appropriate judgment..
.1943 The duty of loyalty has been described as "the punctilio of an
37. La. Mun. Police Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1180 (Del.
Ch. 2007).
38. Cf ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123 (1986) (noting that courts
have long recognized the tension in corporate law between directors' discretion and
accountability). Cf Oniicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930 (Del.
2003) ("There are inherent conflicts between a board's interest in protecting a merger
transaction it has approved, the stockholders' statutory right to make the final decision
to either approve or not approve a merger, and the board's continuing responsibility to
effectively exercise its fiduciary duties at all times after the merger agreement is
executed.").
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2009).
40. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
41. "The directors of Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary
duties: due care, loyalty and good faith." Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90
(Del. 2001).
42. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
43. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996)
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honor the most sensitive . . ."44 Directors should not "prefer[] the
adverse self-interest of the fiduciary ... to the interest of the corporation
.... "4' The duty to act in good faith is violated in cases of "intentional
dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one's responsibilities, '46 or
where the directors act "for some purpose other than a genuine attempt
to advance corporate welfare. 47
Under the business judgment rule, there is a "presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company.,4 8 This "rule operates to
preclude a court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business and
affairs of a corporation., 49 Accordingly, the directors' "decisions will
not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business
purpose."' "The business judgment rule shields directors from judicial
second-guessing for all but the most careless acts, and court will only
consider the substantive fairness of a deal when the loyalty of directors
is compromised by a conflict of interest."51
Notwithstanding the general applicability of the business judgment
rule, Delaware courts have employed heightened standards for the
review of certain corporate actions: Revlon and Unocal standards.52
Board conduct can be subject to enhanced scrutiny under the
Revlon standard. Revlon did not however create any new fiduciary
duties. In a Revlon situation, the board must perform its fiduciary duties
in the service of a specific objective: "maximizing the sale price of the
(emphasis omitted).
44. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
45. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006).
46. Id. at 63.
47. Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(emphasis omitted) (citing Miller v. AT&T Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974)).
48. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
49. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
50. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
51. See Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 29 J. CoRp. L. 569, 576 (2004).
52. In addition to the Revlon and Unocal tests, the Blasius standard of review
applies where a board action specifically attempts to interfere with a shareholder vote.
In this case, the directors must demonstrate a "compelling justification" for their
actions. See generally Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
It is, however, not clear whether Blasius applies to shareholder votes in the merger
context. See Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 809 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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company for the stockholders' benefit."53 How to achieve this objective
is up to the board. "[T]here is no single blueprint that a board must
follow to fulfill its duties. 54
Although [the Revlon] enhanced scrutiny test involves a review of
the reasonableness of the substantive merits of a board's actions, a
court should not ignore the complexity of the directors' task in a sale
of control. There are many business and financial considerations
implicated in investigating and selecting the best value reasonably
available. The board of directors is the corporate decision-making
body best equipped to make these judgments. Accordingly, a court
applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the
directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a
board selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should
not second-guess that choice even though it might have decided
otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board's
decision. Thus, courts will not substitute their business judgment for
that of the directors, but will determine if the directors' decision was,
on balance, within a range of reasonableness.
55
Revlon duties are triggered when there is a change of control caused
by a cash-out merger or a break-up of the corporate entity.56
Where the Unocal test is applicable, "the board must establish: (1)
that it had reasonable grounds to believe that the hostile bid for control
threatened corporate policy and effectiveness; and (2) that the defensive
measures adopted were reasonable in relation to the threat posed."' 57
This latter proportionality inquiry involves a two-step analysis. The first
part of the test is met by showing the response was not "draconian, 58
i.e. not "coercive or preclusive,, 59 and the second - that the response
was within the "range of reasonableness" ' 60 to the perceived threat. A
response is "coercive" if it is aimed at forcing upon stockholders a
53. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del.
1986).
54. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).
55. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45-46
(Del. 1994) (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del.
1985)).
56. Id.
57. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 330 (Del. Ch. 2000).
58. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
59. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1365 (Del. 1995).
60. Id. at 1388.
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management-sponsored alternative to a hostile offer. 61  A response is
"preclusive" if it deprives stockholders of the right to receive all tender
offers or precludes a bidder from seeking control by fundamentally
restricting proxy contests or otherwise.62 This level of scrutiny applies
"whenever the record reflects that a board of directors took defensive
measures in response to a 'perceived 'threat to corporate policy and
effectiveness which touches upon issues of corporate control.""' ' 63 The
Unocal standard applies "[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a
board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of
the corporation and its shareholders." 64
II. THE OMNICARE DECISION: LIMITS ON DEAL PROTECTION DEVICES
On April 4, 2003 the Delaware Supreme Court rendered a rare
three-two split decision that imposed certain limits on deal protection
devices used in corporate acquisition transactions. 6' This decision
generated vigorous critiques in the literature66 and was even perceived to
threaten to "[fjundamentally [a]lter the [m]erger [i]ndustry. '67
61. See id. at 1387.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 1372 n.9 (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 82 (Del. 1992)).
64. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
65. Before Omnicare, the deal protection jurisprudence was inconsistent. In Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Consolidated Civil Action No. 17383, 1999
Del. Ch. LEXIS 202 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999); ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d
95 (Del. Ch. 1999); and McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2000),
the Delaware Chancery Court called into question the validity of deal protection
measures, suggesting that they should be reviewed under the Unocal standard. In In re
IXC Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., Consolidated C.A. No. 17324, 1999 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 210, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) and Wisconsin Investment Board v.
Bartlett, C.A. No. 17727, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at **30-31 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24,
2000), the court suggested that deal protection measures should be valid after a properly
conducted reasonableness review that gives due deference to the target board's business
judgment. See generally Varallo & Raju, supra note 11.
66. Professor Eric A. Chiappinelli predicted that Omnicare would become the most
controversial corporate case of the past 20 years. See Robin Sidel, Deals & Deal
Makers: Merger Business Faces New Order with Court Ruling on 'Lockups', WALL ST.
J., Apr. 7, 2003, at C4.
67. See Brian C. Smith, Changing the Deal: How Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare
Threatens to Fundamentally Alter the Merger Industry, 73 MIss. L.J. 983 (2004).
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A. Factual Background and Holding
NCS Healthcare, Inc., a troubled pharmacy services provider that
was insolvent in 2001, was the object of competing acquisition bids by
Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. and Omnicare, Inc. The stock-for-stock
merger agreement between NCS and Genesis was negotiated for NCS by
an Independent Committee consisting of two of four NCS directors:
Boake Sells and Richard Osborne. 68 The Genesis merger agreement
contained a "force-the-vote" provision, which required that the
agreement be submitted to the NCS shareholders for a vote even if the
NCS board no longer recommended it. 69 Two NCS shareholders, Jon
Outcalt ° and Kevin Shaw,7 were owners of Class B common shares,
which, although virtually identical in every other respect to the Class A
common shares, were entitled to ten times more votes per share than
Class A shares. These two shareholders, although owning about 20% of
NCS outstanding stock, held a majority (over 65%) of the NCS voting
power and agreed unconditionally to vote all of their shares in favor of
the Genesis merger.72 In addition, Outcalt and Shaw undertook not to
transfer their shares prior to the shareholder vote on the merger
agreement and granted to Genesis an irrevocable proxy to vote their
shares in favor of the merger agreement. The voting agreements were
specifically enforceable by Genesis. The merger agreement provided
that, if either Outcalt or Shaw breached the voting agreements, Genesis
would be entitled to receive the agreed termination fee ($6 million). The
merger agreement contained an obligation for NCS, in the event of
agreement termination, to pay Genesis's documented expenses, in the
amount of up to $5million.73 The merger agreement contained a no-
shop obligation for NCS, which was subject to a fiduciary-out."4
After the Genesis merger agreement had been signed, Omnicare
75
filed a lawsuit attempting to invalidate the Genesis merger agreement
and the voting agreements between Genesis and Outcalt and Shaw. At
68. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 922 (Del. 2003). The
authority to approve any transaction remained with the full four-member board. Id.
69. Id. at 918.
70. Outcalt was also Chairman of the NCS board of directors. Id.
71. Shaw was President, CEO, and a director of NCS. Id. at 918-19.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 926.
74. Id. at 925-26.
75. Omnicare had purchased a minor stock in NCS shortly before the lawsuit was
filed. Id. at 919, 926.
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the same time, Omnicare submitted to the NCS board an irrevocable all-
cash proposal that was superior to the Genesis deal. As a result, the
NCS board withdrew its endorsement of the Genesis merger and instead
recommended that NCS shareholders reject the Genesis transaction.76
However, the NCS board still had to submit the Genesis merger
agreement for a shareholder vote and two major NCS shareholders were
bound by the terms of their voting agreements with Genesis.
In addition, certain other NCS shareholders sought to invalidate the
Genesis merger agreement.77
The Delaware Supreme Court accepted, for the purposes of the
legal review at hand, the reasoning of the Chancery Court that because
the stock-for-stock merger agreement between NCS and Genesis did not
result in change of control and NCS did not start an active bidding
process, the directors' duties under Revlon were not triggered.
Therefore, the Revlon standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny was
inapplicable.
The court held, however, that the deal protection devices contained
in the NCS/Genesis merger agreement were subject to the Unocal
enhanced judicial scrutiny test.78 The court applied the two-prong test of
Unocal. The NCS directors must first demonstrate "that they had
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed . . . ,,79 To satisfy that burden, the NCS directors
were required to show that they acted in good faith after conducting a
reasonable investigation. The threat identified by the NCS board was
the possibility of losing the Genesis offer and being left with no
comparable alternative transaction. The second stage of the Unocal test
required the NCS directors to demonstrate that their defensive response
was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."8 ° This latter proportion-
ality inquiry involved a two-step analysis. The NCS directors had to
establish that the deal protection devices adopted in response to the
threat were neither coercive nor preclusive, and then demonstrate that
their response was within a "range of reasonableness" 81 to the perceived
threat.
In the context of a shareholder vote, coercion exists "where the
76. Id. at 927.
77. Id. at 919.
78. Id. at 934.
79. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
80. Id.
81. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995).
2010
698 FORDHAMJOURNAL Vol. XV
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LA W
board or some other party takes actions which have the effect of causing
the stockholders to vote in favor of the proposed transaction for some
reason other than the merits of that transaction. ' 2 The court ruled that,
because the arrangements with Genesis rendered an alternative deal
"mathematically impossible, 83 a "fait accompli,'' 4 the deal protection
measures were designed to coerce the consummation of the Genesis
merger and preclude the consideration of a superior transaction by NCS
stockholders and, therefore, violated the principles of Unocal/Unitrin.
The court held that the deal protection devices were also invalid and
unenforceable on the alternate grounds that the merger agreement
provided no effective fiduciary-out.8 5
B. Omnicare's Standard Applicable to Deal Protection Devices:
Unocal Enhanced Judicial Scrutiny
Unocal established that enhanced judicial scrutiny should be
applied to a board's adoption of defensive measures in response to a
hostile takeover proposal that the board believes is a threat to corporate
policy and effectiveness.86 The majority in Omnicare explained its
reasons for applying the Unocal test to deal protection devices:
There are inherent conflicts between a board's interest in protecting a
merger transaction it has approved, the stockholders' statutory right
to make the final decision to either approve or not approve a merger,
and the board's continuing responsibility to effectively exercise its
fiduciary duties at all times after the merger agreement is executed..
. .A board's decision to protect its decision to enter a merger
agreement with defensive devices against uninvited competing
transactions that may emerge is analogous to a board's decision to
protect against dangers to corporate policy and effectiveness when it
adopts defensive measures in a hostile takeover contest. 87
The Delaware Chancery Court stated that deal protection provisions
are of "obviously defensive nature. 88 Some commentators argued that
82. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935 (Del. 2003) (citing
Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1382-83 (Del. 1996)).
83. Id. at 936.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 937.
86. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
87. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 930, 932.
88. McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 506 n.62 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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deal protection provisions defend the merger agreement and therefore
are "inherently defensive, 89 because their adoption gives rise to the
same potential conflict of interest as do directors' defensive actions in
the event of hostile takeover threat. Under this reasoning, Unocal
enhanced scrutiny should be the proper standard for judicial review of
deal protections. 90
Other commentators, arguing in support of Omnicare, contend that
sellers should be prohibited from providing buyers in non-Revlon
transactions with "bulletproof' 9' protection. Instead, sellers should be
permitted to provide protection only to the extent necessary to
compensate bidders for the transaction and for the opportunity costs of
making bids. A well-measured termination fee should be sufficient for
this purpose. Limiting the ability of selling boards to grant bullet-
proofing will result in enhanced social welfare. There are structural
biases in the bargaining process that make it difficult for sellers to resist
bulletproof transactions in a bilateral negotiation. These biases make it
necessary to have a mandatory rule that prevents sellers from agreeing to
bulletproof a transaction. 92
The Omnicare-majority supportive view remains a minority view in
the literature.
C. Omnicare's Dissents
Dissenting to the majority in Omnicare, Chief Justice Veasey
argued that "[t]he Unocal doctrine applies to unilateral board actions
that are defensive and reactive in nature," 93 and therefore that Unocal
should not apply in the friendly merger context. In this case, the
business judgment rule should apply to a board of directors' decision
that is free from self-interest, made with due care, and in good faith.
94
89. Mark Lebovitch & Peter B. Morrison, Calling a Duck a Duck: Determining the
Validity of Deal Protection Provisions in Merger of Equals Transactions, 2001 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 1, 14 (2001).
90. Id. at 8.
91. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 923.
92. See Brian J.M. Quinn, Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32
IOWA J. CORP. L. 865, 867 (2007).
93. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 943 n. 102 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting). Cf Williams
v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996) ("A Unocal analysis should be used only
when a board unilaterally (i.e., without shareholder approval) adopts defensive
measures....").
94. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 940 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting); id. at 947 (Steele, J.,
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Justice Veasey reasoned that there was no threat that the board was
acting out of its own self-interest; therefore, the deal protection devices
should not be considered defensive.95
Justice Veasey further reasoned that, even if Unocal was applicable,
the measures protecting the Genesis merger were neither coercive nor
preclusive. Such measures were adopted by Shaw and Outcalt through
the lens of their independent assessment of the merits of the transaction.
Genesis would not save NCS, its creditors and its stockholders without
these provisions. The deal protection measures were an integral part of
the merits of the transaction.
96
Justice Veasey stated that the absolute requirement of a fiduciary-
out, as stipulated in the majority's opinion, was unsupported by
Delaware case law and invited unwarranted judicial review into the
risk/return analysis of boards of directors, which had traditionally been
granted judicial deference under the business judgment rule. 97
D. Critique of the Majori in Omnicare
Omnicare was "bad law, bad economics and bad policy." 98  In
addition to the legal arguments used by the Omnicare's dissenting
judges, the following arguments support the critique.
The Omnicare ruling is based on two grounds: reasonableness-
proportionality under Unocal and anti-disablement under QVC.
Application of the Unocal standard to deal protection devices in
friendly mergers is debatable. 99 In addition, application of the Unocal
dissenting).
95. Id. at 940 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting); id. at 947 (Steele, J., dissenting). Cf
Griffith, supra note 12, at 1913 ("[I]t is not at all clear how the 'threat' [from the
Unocal threat/response paradigm] should be defined in ... a friendly deal.").
96. Id. at 943-44 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 945 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting); id. at 948 (Steele, J., dissenting).
98. Griffith, supra note 51, at 623. The majority in Omnicare seems to have been
motivated by pretextual issues. The court was troubled by the voting control held by
two majority shareholders via heavy-voting Class B shares. Also, there are indications
of the court's suspicions of procedural due care violation. See Daniel C. Davis,
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare: A Critical Appraisal, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 177, 191-94
(2007). In addition, the court seems to have been suspicious of duty of loyalty violation
by the two directors who were also shareholders, vis-A-vis minority shareholders.
"[T]he stockholder voting agreements were inextricably intertwined with the defensive
aspects of the Genesis merger agreement." Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 934.
99. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. It could be argued that, in practical
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standard in a non-Revlon situation, where the target board does not have
to maximize short-term shareholder welfare, is unreasonably strict. The
Unocal analysis as applied to deal protection devices creates a catch-22
situation:' 00 if the deal protection devices are coercive or preclusive,
they are not within a range of reasonable responses under the
proportionality requirement; but those devices may be outside the range
of reasonable responses even if not coercive or preclusive under the
reasonable threat requirement. 0
Even applying the Unocal analysis one should come to the
conclusion that the deal protection measures in the Genesis merger
agreement were not unreasonably coercive. Under the Williams test, an
action coercive for the shareholders must be designed to obtain a
shareholder approval of a transaction that is not based on the
transaction's merits.' °2 What reasons, other than the merits of the tran-
saction, caused NCS shareholders to vote in favor of the proposed
transaction? First, one should ask which shareholders the court need
concern itself with. The deal protections were not coercive as to the
controlling shareholders, Outcalt and Shaw in this case. Omnicare was
not a case where the board had imposed something on the shareholders;
Outcalt and Shaw voluntarily signed the voting agreements with
Genesis.103 In this case, the court should have focused its inquiry on the
deal protection's impact on the public shareholders:
effect, Unocal has "little critical bite." Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The
Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583, 585 (1994).
"Unocal .... no longer substantially constrains board conduct." Griffith, supra note 12,
at 1914 n.57. Griffith refers to a study conducted by Professors Robert B. Thompson
and Gordon D. Smith, which showed that between 1985 and 2000, the Delaware
Supreme Court let all board defensive actions outside of a Revlon context pass the
Unocal test. However, it was the application of the Unocal test that rendered the deal
protection devices in the NCS/Genesis merger agreement invalid.
100. The court in Omnicare called it "disjunctive analysis." Omnicare, 818 A.2d at
935.
101. See Orman v. Cullman, Civ. A. No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150, at **25-
26 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004).
102. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1382-83 (Del. 1996).
103. In addition, it was not a regular conflict-of-interest situation, where the director
represents the corporation on one side of the transaction, e.g., as buyer, and
simultaneously acts on the other side of the same transaction in the individual capacity,
e.g., as seller. The directors Outcalt and Shaw were, by virtue of their shareholder
position, naturally interested in the highest price for their shares. By locking-up the
allegedly less valuable deal with Genesis they deprived themselves of the additional
premium they would receive from the Omnicare deal.
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NCS's public shareholders (who owned 80% of NCS and
overwhelmingly supported the Omnicare's offer) will be forced to
accept the Genesis merger because of the structural defenses
approved by the NCS board. Consequently, the record reflects that
any stockholder vote would have been robbed of its effectiveness by
the impermissible coercion that predetermined the outcome of the
merger without regard to the merits of the Genesis transaction at the
time the vote was scheduled to be taken.
104
Class A public shareholders were effectively disenfranchised, as
they did not have enough voting power to either accept or reject the deal.
Ultimately, the inability of the Class A shareholders to effect the
outcome of the merger, and not the structural devices approved by the
NCS board, made public shareholders accept the Genesis merger. 105
The majority in Omnicare was correct that minority shareholders
should receive protection against coercive and preclusive bids approved
by the board, but this protection should not go so far as to impair the
right of the majority to vote their shares as they see fit. 10 6 The court in
Unitrin did not mention the minority shareholder franchise; the minority
protection language in Omnicare came from QVC. However, since the
Genesis merger agreement was not subject to Revlon scrutiny, the
fiduciary duty language of QVC was inapplicable.'0 7 As the Delaware
Chancery Court stated later in Orman v. Cullman, "it cannot be the case
that whenever a controlling stockholder can vote against a sale the out-
voted minority can assert a coercion claim.' ' 8  "Our [j]urisprudence
[d]oes [n]ot [c]ompel ... [c]ourt[s] to [i]nvalidate the [j]oint [a]ction of
the [b]oard and the [c]ontrolling [s]tockholders."' 0 9
To achieve the same result as a combination of voting agreements
104. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935-36 (Del. 2003).
105. Cf Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are
Circumstances in Which It Is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to
the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 Bus. LAw. 877, 901 & n.97 (2005):
[S]tockholders who controlled a majority of the votes and who were receiving the
same per share consideration as the minority, had approved the transaction, meaning
that free and unconflicted stockholder choice was vindicated .... Once a court
concludes.., that a controlling stockholder has no interest in conflict from that of the
other stockholders, the controlling stockholder's own choice to approve a transaction
becomes very strong evidence of the fairness of accepting that deal.
106. See Smith, supra note 67, at 999.
107. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 945-46 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
108. Orman v. Cullman, Civ. A. No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150, at *33 n.92
(Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004).
109. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 942 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
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with the majority shareholders and a 'force-the-vote' provision in the
merger agreement, Outcalt and Shaw could simply have signed written
consents.11° This tactic was subsequently endorsed by the Delaware
Chancery Court, in Optima v. WC[. "'
The problem with the application of the anti-disablement argument
under QVC is that the absence of a change of control in Omnicare
represented a critical distinction between Omnicare and QVC."12
The risk of self-interest for the board in locked-up deals could be
countered by imposing a market-check requirement on the board. A
market check can be either pre-signing or post-signing.113 An active
market check might impose certain constraints into what might other-
wise be an unconstrained decision by a self-serving board by reintro-
ducing the market for corporate control into the merger process. 114
Applying the Unocal test to deal protection devices can cause
practical difficulty. In addition, "the test would appear to result in
judicial invalidation of negotiated contractual provisions based on the
advantages of hindsight."'1 5 The board, at the time of adopting deal
protections, cannot know the terms of a future transaction. "[T]he NCS
board's good faith decision must be subject to a real-time review of the
board action .... ,,16
The Omnicare ruling threatened to prohibit merger agreements to
provide the initial acquirer with certainty that its transaction will close.
This certainty is not only in the interests of the acquirer, but also in the
interests of the target. It has a value that can be traded; it is a
110. Section 228 of Delaware General Corporation Law allows for written consents
in lieu of shareholder meeting, unless otherwise provided in the certificate of
incorporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (2010).
111. See infra Part III.E.
112. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
113. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286-87 (Del. 1989). Cf
Griffith, supra note 51, at 615-22. This argument was used by Delaware courts prior to
Omnicare. In two pre-Omnicare decisions the court held that where the target board
had engaged in some form of a market test, business judgment deference to the board's
actions would be appropriate. In re IXC Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A.
No. 17334, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999); Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v.
Bartlett, C.A. No. 17727, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2000).
114. See Griffith, supra note 51, at 618.
115. Orman v. Cullman, Civ. A. No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150, at *35 n. 98
(Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004).
116. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 940 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
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"[v]aluable [t]rading [c]ommodity."117 A lockup permits a target board
and a bidder to "exchange certainties"'1 18 by way of requiring the
acquirer to pay a premium for the increased certainty that the transaction
will be consummated. Improved transactional certainty increases target
shareholder welfare,119 and most corporate law scholars address
efficiency concerns from the perspective of shareholder welfare
maximization. As Justice Veasey noted in his Omnicare dissent,
"[s]ituations will arise where business realities demand a lock-up so that
wealth-enhancing transactions may go forward."
120
If the target board loses the ability to pre-commit, no reservation
value will be put on the table by the first bidder in the beginning; the
acquirer will simply discount its bid to reflect its uncertainty concerning
target's commitment. 121 Some bidders will not bid at all.
As a matter of policy, the Omnicare majority was correctly
criticized for announcing a per se rule that seemed to exceed the
Delaware courts' traditional equitable authority and tended toward
quasi-legislative lawmaking. The key issue of the attack by the
Omnicare majority was the combined effect of the shareholder voting
agreements and the "force-the-vote" provision in the merger agreement.
Both such instruments, however, were specifically authorized by
statute. 1
22
III. LIMITING OMNICARE
Against expressed fears, 123 Omnicare did not fundamentally alter
the merger landscape. Rather, the courts' approach to deal protection
devices has been changing after Omnicare. Post-Omnicare case law
shows that the narrow view of the holding in Omnicare has prevailed, as
117. Griffith, supra note 51, at 613.
118. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 942 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (citing Rand v. W. Air
Lines, C.A. No. 8632, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1994), affd, 659
A.2d 228 (Del. 1995)).
119. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423, 1423
(1993) ("Shareholder wealth maximization long has been the fundamental norm which
guides U.S. corporate decisionmakers.").
120. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 942 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
121. Cf Griffith, supra note 51, at 614.
122. See Strine, supra note 105, at 898-99.
123. See Smith, supra note 67, at 983-84.
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suggested by Justice Veasey in his dissent. 124
Courts have been limiting Omnicare in the context of non-Revlon
transactions by either distinguishing the facts from Omnicare or
applying a different standard of review: the business judgment rule.
If the parties can distinguish the merger's circumstances and con-
vince a court the deal protection measures in question did not make the
transaction afait accompli, then deal protection devices are not coercive
(Orman v. Cullman). Alternatively, courts can apply the business
judgment rule instead, as in Bear Stearns 25 and Ehrenhaus v. Baker.116
Even in judicial review of Revlon transactions, the limits of
reasonableness have been loosened towards "business logic"'127 and
business judgment (Toys "R" Us, Topps, 128 Lear, Optima v. WCI, Ryan
v. Lyondel129).
A. Orman v. Cullman
1. Factual Background and Holding
Swedish Match AB, a Swedish tobacco company, intended to
merge with General Cigar Holdings, Inc., a cigar manufacturer. General
Cigar was controlled by the Cullman family. The Cullmans' control was
by virtue of a dual-class structure: the family's Class B common stock
was entitled to ten votes per share. As a result, shareholders unaffiliated
with the Cullmans did not have voting control. 30 Edgar Cullman, Sr.
was General Cigar chairman and Edgar Cullman, Jr. was CEO. The
merger agreement with Swedish Match was negotiated by a special
committee consisting of non-Cullman family members. The special
committee was however not authorized to solicit offers from third
124. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 946 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting). Cf. Guhan
Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and
Implications, 63 Bus. LAW. 729, 758 n. 118 (2008) ("Post-Omnicare decisions in the
Delaware Court of Chancery have already cut back on its scope.").
125. In re Bear Steams Litig., 870 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
126. Ehrenhaus v. Baker, Civil Action No. 08 CVS 22632, 2008 NCBC LEXIS 21,
at **95-104 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008).
127. In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 116 (Del. Ch. 2007).
128. In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007).
129. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105
(Del. Ch. July 29, 2008), rev'd, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
130. Orman v. Cullman, Civ. A. No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150, at *6 n.15
(Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004).
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parties.' 3 ' The merger agreement contained no termination fee. 32 It
permitted General Cigar's board to entertain unsolicited acquisition
proposals from third parties if the board concluded that such a proposal
was bona fide and would be more favorable to the non-affiliated
shareholders. 33 "The [merger] agreement also permitted the board to
withdraw its recommendation . . . if the board concluded ... that its
fiduciary duties so required."1 34 The Cullman family undertook not to
sell their shares or vote for any alternative acquisition proposal for 18
months following the termination of the merger agreement. 35  The
merger was conditioned upon a separate class vote by the Class A
shareholders; the Cullman family agreed to vote their Class A shares pro
rata in accordance with the vote of the non-affiliated Class A
shareholders. 1
36
A non-affiliated shareholder, Joseph Orman, sued the General Cigar
board for breach of fiduciary duties in negotiating the merger terms.
The Delaware Chancery Court ruled that by entering into a voting
agreement with Swedish Match, the Cullman directors did not breach
their fiduciary duties. "Nothing in the voting agreement prevented the
Cullmans from exercising their duties as officers and directors." 137 The
court applied the Unocal enhanced scrutiny test to the deal protection
provisions in the merger agreement. It held that at the Unocal first step
the board demonstrated that it had reasonable grounds for believing that
a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed, since without
accepting the deal protections General Cigar risked losing the Swedish
Match deal. At the second Unocal step, the deal protections were found
not to be coercive 138 because the General Cigar board had negotiated a
fiduciary-out, the non-affiliated shareholders retained the power to reject
the proposed merger with Swedish Match and a third party was not
precluded from going forward with an alternative transaction. 
139
131. Id. at *6.
132. Id. at *8.
133. Id. at*12.
134. Id. at **12-13.
135. Id. at*10.
136. Id. at **6 n.15, 13-14 & n.44.
137. Id. at *21 (emphasis omitted).
138. Id. at *28 n. 81. The plaintiff did not argue that the deal protection provisions
were "preclusive," so that only "coercion" was at issue.
139. Id. at **31-32.
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2. Factual Distinctions?
Under the merger agreement's terms, the Cullmans' control over
General Cigar was to be shared with Swedish Match. 40 Therefore it
was a non-Revlon transaction. The court distinguished this case from
both QVC and Omnicare. It pointed out that the Cullmans had entered
into a voting agreement as shareholders. This allegedly "meaningful'
' 41
factual distinction is counterfactual. Outcalt and Shaw in Omnicare
signed their voting agreements with Genesis not in their capacity as
NCS directors, but as shareholders, just as the Cullmans did. 142
The court distinguished the transaction from Omnicare, reasoning:
(i) the minority shareholders could veto the deal; and (ii) a third party
was not precluded by the 18-month abstention period stipulated in the
Cullmans' voting agreement. The court stated that the Cullmans' agree-
ment to vote their Class A shares pro rata in accordance with the vote of
the non-affiliated shareholders effectively gave the non-affiliated
shareholders veto power over the proposed merger. 143 However, if the
non-affiliated shareholders used their veto power, they would not be
able to reap the fruits of another deal for 18 months due to the Cullmans'
voting agreement.
To what degree was the merger of General Cigar and Sweedish
Match afait accompli? Apparently none, as the court found that it was
not afait accompli. The court acknowledged that the vote of the non-
affiliated shareholders "may have been influenced by the existence of
the deal protection measures," 144 but since "no other suitor was waiting
in the wings" 145 the court did not find that this influence amounted to an
impermissible coercion. 146 The argument that a third-party bidder was
not precluded by the 18-month abstention obligation in the Cullmans'
voting agreement, although theoretically correct, failed to recognize that
no other deal within the next 18 months was possible in practice.
The court honored the voting agreement entered into by the
140. Id. at *4 & n.11.
141. Id. at*21.
142. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. Cf Davis, supra note 98, at
187.
143. Orman v. Cullman, Civ. A. No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150 at **13-14
(Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004).
144. Id. at *31.
145. Id. at *36.
146. Id. at *37.
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Cullmans as majority shareholders. "A majority shareholder has
discretion as to when to sell his stock and to whom, a discretion that
comes from the majority shareholder's rights qua shareholder."' 141 This
statement was supported by a reference to Omnicare: "[t]he stock-
holders with majority voting power ... had an absolute right to sell or
exchange their shares with a third party at any price."'' 48 However, in
Omnicare this "absolute right" of the majority shareholders did not
preclude the court from invalidating the deal protections on the grounds
of their coerciveness for the minority shareholders. 1
49
Although the results of application of the Unocal test were different
from Omnicare, which was based on comparable facts, in Orman v.
Cullman the court did not yet question the application of the Unocal
enhanced scrutiny test to the deal protection provisions in non-Revlon
transactions. This was to happen later, in Bear Stearns150 and
Ehrenhaus v. Baker.5 ' In addition, courts started to give more
deference to the directors' business judgment in Revlon cases. 52
B. Toys "R" Us. Inc. Shareholder Litigation
1. Factual Background and Holding
By the end of 2003, Toys "R" Us, Inc., a toys and baby products
retail company, was faced with declining profits in its largest division,
Global Toys, and a low stock price. The board, consisting mostly of
independent directors, explored strategic alternatives to deliver more
value to the shareholders. Toys "R" Us sought bids from several
potential buyers. The consortium of KKR, Bain Capital, and Vornado
proposed to acquire the whole company and topped the next-most-
favorable bid. ' The merger agreement with the KKR Group contained
several deal protection provisions. There was a termination fee of
147. Id. at *22 (citing Peter Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Shaw, C.A. No. 20087-
NC, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79 (Del. Ch. July 10, 2003), affd, 840 A.2d 642 (Del.
2003)).
148. Id. at *22 (citing Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc. 818 A.2d 914, 938
(Del. 2003)) (emphasis omitted).
149. See supra Part II.A.
150. See infra Part III.G.
151. See infra Part III.H.
152. See infra Parts III.B-E.
153. See In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 979 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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3.75% of equity value, payable for the most part only if Toys "R" Us
terminated the merger agreement in order to sign another acquisition
proposal within a year, and documented expense reimbursement of up to
$30 million on a so-called "naked no vote."' 5 4 It included a no-shop
provision that permitted the consideration of unsolicited bids.'55 The
acquirer also had a matching right for three business days to counter any
offer made by a rival bidder. '56
Two institutional investors who held shares in Toys "R" Us brought
a fiduciary duty claim. They sought invalidation of the termination fee
and the matching right in the merger agreement claiming that the deal
protection measures were draconian and precluded any topping bid. '57
The Delaware Chancery Court ruled that the board did not breach
its fiduciary duty and did not act unreasonably when it agreed to the deal
protection measures. The court held that the size of the termination fee,
the no-shop provision and the matching right did not act as a serious
barrier to any bidder willing to pay materially more than KKR's offer. 1
5 8
It was a Revlon transaction (change of control from dispersed to
concentrated ownership) in which the directors had to seek the highest
value deal that could be secured for stockholders and the heightened
standard of reasonableness review applied. However, under the QVC
"range of reasonableness" test, a decision to sell a company does not
prevent the board from offering deal protections to bidders, so long as its
decision to do so was reasonably directed to the objective of obtaining
the highest price, and not by a "selfish or idiosyncratic desire by the
board to tilt the playing field towards a particular bidder for reasons
unrelated to the stockholders' ability to get top dollar." "9
2. Revlon Enhanced Judicial Review Standard
The court applied the Revlon standard and refused to give to the
protection provisions "the type of close examination of the
reasonableness . . . that is contemplated by the Unocal . . .
154. That is, a shareholder vote to decline the merger agreement that is not followed
by the acceptance of an alternative proposal. Id. at 997.
155. Id. at 996-97.
156. Id. at 997.
157. Id. at 998.
158. Id. at 1018.
159. Id. at 1000-01 (citing Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del.
1989)).
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standard[] .. ,,160 The plaintiffs used the Unocal front-end / back-end
argument 16 to challenge the actions of the board, who, by agreeing to
the deal protection provisions in the KKR merger agreement, allegedly
dissuaded any other bidder from presenting a topping offer. However,
the court did not use the Unocal/Unitrin analysis and simply stated that
the deal protection measures were not draconian. 1
62
The court seemed to suggest that the amount of the market check
and the strength of deal protections should be comparable. The court
found that there was a lengthy pre-signing market check conducted by
the target board in good faith and higher-value bidders were unlikely to
emerge. "[A]nyone interested had... multiple chances to present.., a
serious expression of interest - none had done So.
' 163
Reinforcing Barkan, the court stated that the board can even make a
tactical choice not to perform an active pre-signing market check:
[The Delaware] Supreme Court has held that the duty to take
reasonable steps to secure the highest immediately available price
does not invariably require a board to conduct an auction process or
even a targeted market canvass in the first instance, emphasizing that
there is 'no single blue-print' for fulfilling the duty to maximize
value. 164
The court took a position on Omnicare. To the court, Omnicare's
approach represented an "aberrational departure"' 165 from the QVC
principle. In support of its ruling, the court cited not the "controversial
majority opinion," 166 but the Omnicare dissenting opinions. 161
C. Topps Company Shareholders Litigation
1. Factual Background and Holding
The Topps Company, Inc., a trading card and candy maker, was
exploring strategic options to grow. Michael Eisner, a private equity
160. Id. at 1016.
161. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).
162. See In re Toys "R" Us, 877 A.2dat 1021.
163. Id. at 1018.
164. Id. at 1000 (citing Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286).
165. Id. at 1016 n.68.
166. Id. at 1018 n.70.
167. Id. at 1016 n.68.
STRETCHING THE LIMITS
investor, expressed an interest in making a bid to take the company
private, but insisted on the absence of any pre-signing auction.
168
19169
"Eisner ... envisioned [the] retention of existing management ....
A merger agreement was reached. The go-shop provision in the merger
agreement gave Topps the right to actively solicit alternative bids for 40
days after signing and the right to accept a Superior Proposal, subject
only to Eisner's receipt of a termination fee and a matching right. The
termination fee was bifurcated and amounted to approximately 3% of
the transaction value during the go-shop period and 4.6% of the
transaction value after the go-shop period. 70 Shortly before the Eisner
merger agreement was approved by the Topps' board, The Upper Deck
Company, Topps' main competitor, expressed a willingness to make a
bid. During the go-shop process Upper Deck emerged as the only
serious bidder. Although Upper Deck had topped Eisner's bid, subject
to some conditions, the Topps board decided not to continue
negotiations with Upper Deck. After the end of the go-shop period,
Upper Deck made another unsolicited bid, which Topps refused to
recognize as a Superior Proposal. 17' As a result, Eisner did not have to
either match Upper Deck's price or step aside subject to payment of a
reverse break-up fee. 172 Topps required Upper Deck to sign a standstill
agreement prohibiting Upper Deck from proceeding with a tender offer
without permission from the Topps board.'73
Upper Deck and some Topps shareholders moved for a preliminary
injunction against the procession of the shareholder vote on the Eisner
merger. The plaintiffs argued that, under Revlon principles, the board
should not deny the shareholders the chance to make an uncoerced
decision for themselves and that the deal protection measures in the
Eisner merger agreement precluded any effective post-signing market
check. 174
The Delaware Chancery Court applied the Revlon standard of
168. See In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 61 (Del. Ch. 2007).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 65.
171. Id. at 62.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 66.
174. The motion was ultimately granted on disclosure grounds, In re Topps Co.
S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 63, 93 (Del. Ch. 2007), which are different from the
issues under consideration in this Essay. Here I only focus on deal protections and
related issues.
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review. It held that the deal protections as a whole "seem to have left
reasonable room for an effective post-signing market check,"' 175 although
the termination fee of 4.3% 176 of the total deal value was "a bit high in
percentage terms."' 177 The court took into consideration "the potential
utility of having the proverbial bird in hand."' 1 8 However, Upper Deck
was released from the standstill agreement on the grounds that the Topps
board acted with self-interest when it did not allow Upper Deck to
proceed with a higher-priced offer. 1
79
2. Revlon Reasonableness Tainted by the Board's Self-Interest
The court found the deal protections in the Eisner merger
agreement (a go-shop paired with a termination fee and a matching
right) to be reasonable under Revlon. "For 40 days, the Topps board
could shop like Paris Hilton."' 80 A go-shop provision instead of a pre-
signing market check was held to be reasonable. The court indicated
that go-shops may be useful in inducing other bids because the existence
of a "credible [and] committed" initial acquirer may act as a form of
"sucker's insurance" for others to take the leap and submit a bid.' 8
A go-shop provision protects the deal indirectly. On the one hand,
go-shops are usually paired with such deal protections as termination
fees and matching rights. On the other hand a go-shop provision
eliminates, from the target board's prospective, the requirement to have
a pre-signing market check. However, go-shops as a post-signing
market check mechanism are not a full alternative to a pre-signing
market check. Critics argue that third party bidders are less likely to
emerge post-signing and go-shops are merely "window dressing."'
' 82
175. Id. at 86.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 87.
179. Id. at 92.
180. Id. at 86.
181. Id. at 87.
182. Mark A. Morton & Roxanne L. Houtman, Go-Shops: Market Check Magic or
Mirage?, AT'VY ADVERTISING, Feb. 2008, available at http://www.potteranderson.com/
assets/attachments/Go-ShopsRevFeb2008.pdf. Cf Christina M. Sautter, Shopping
During Extended Store Hours: From No Shops to Go-Shops: The Development,
Effectiveness, and Implications of Go-Shop Provisions in Change of Control
Transactions, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 525, 572 (2008) (noting that go-shops are "[n]ot [s]o
[d]ifferent from [n]ot [s]hopping [a]fter [a]11").
STRETCHING THE LIMITS
For other potential bidders a go-shop provision presents a big problem
as they have to start at a huge disadvantage. Commentators also point
out that the limited go-shop period can affect a third-party's ability to
come up with a competitive superior proposal, particularly because of its
inability to arrange financing.' 83 Having sanctioned the development
from a pre-signing market check to a go-shop, courts have sanctioned
stronger deal protections and weaker market checks.
The standstill agreement with Upper Deck in effect locked up the
Eisner transaction, since Upper Deck was the only serious alternative
bidder and it could not pursue the acquisition. However, the provision
in the standstill agreement, which allowed Topps to release Upper Deck
from the standstill if the board believed its fiduciary duties so required,
worked as a fiduciary-out. If there were no favoritism towards Eisner by
the Topps management with entrenchment motivations, the court would
have probably endorsed the standstill agreement.
Arguably, the proverbial "bird in hand" is present in any
acquisition, but the court in Topps granted to the proverbial bird greater
credence than the Omnicare court did.
D. Lear Corporation Shareholder Litigation
1. Factual Background and Holding
In 2005, Lear Corporation, an automotive parts supplier, was in the
middle of a restructuring to keep itself healthy in a depressed automotive
industry when billionaire Carl Icahn came along and started investing in
the company with a view to becoming its largest investor. Icahn later
offered to buy the whole company while retaining the Lear management,
but insisted on the absence of a pre-signing auction. 84 The board
agreed, taking into account that an auction could disrupt the company's
business or that it might cause Icahn to withdraw his offer. 185 The
negotiations for Lear were effectively led by its CEO, Robert Rossiter.
The merger agreement contained a moderate termination fee payable if
Lear accepted a superior proposal from another bidder and matching
rights for Icahn. In exchange, Lear got a go-shop for 45 days and the
right to accept an unsolicited superior third-party bid after the go-shop
183. See Thomas J. Dougherty, Securities Litigation: Planning and Strategies:
Takeovers, SM086 ALI-ABA 327, 330 (2007).
184. In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 97 (Del. Ch. 2007).
185. Id. at 104.
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period ended. 186 The board also obtained Icahn's agreement to vote his
shares for any bid superior to his own that was accepted by the board
and that Icahn did not match. 187 Although financial advisors "aggres-
sively"' 88 shopped the company, no topping bid was made. 1
89
Some Lear shareholders moved to enjoin the shareholder vote on
the merger arguing that the Lear board had breached its fiduciary duties
by failing to secure the highest price reasonably available.
The Delaware Chancery Court rejected plaintiffs' claims.' 90 It
pointed out the overall reasonableness of the board's efforts to secure
the highest possible value. The court held that "deal protection meas-
ures did not present an unreasonable barrier to any second-arriving
bidder."' 9'
2. Limiting Topps
In Lear, a tainted CEO negotiated the merger agreement. Icahn
promised to retain the management, which gave them the possibility of
becoming fully vested in their retirement plans within two years.
Rossiter had options which he could net quickly and was granted even
more options as a result of the merger.192 A lower merger price would
likely have set a lower strike price for the options Rossiter received post-
merger. The court freed Rossiter from "fiduciary quandary."'93 It found
that Rossiter did not act "in any way inappropriately,"' 194 because the
Icahn merger would allow all stockholders to sell at a premium.
The court did not want to "elevate a persnickety sense of Ivory
Soap purity over business logic."' 95 It recognized that those suffering
from conflicts are capable of putting them aside. According to the court,
this is the reality of American business history; managers "exploited the
opportunity to work on both sides of a deal."' 196 This is different from
186. Id. at 108.
187. Id. at 121.
188. Id. at 97.
189. Id.
190. The motion was partly granted on disclosure grounds. Here I only focus on deal
protections and related issues. Id. at 97.
191. Id. at 97-98.
192. Id. at 109.
193. Id. at 116.
194. Id. at 114.
195. Id. at 116.
196. Id. at 117.
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the reasoning in Topps, where the court was strictly opposed to any
entrenchment motivations of the board and struck down the standstill
agreement between Topps and Upper Deck based on these grounds. 
197
A pre-signing auction presented the risk of losing Icahn's bid and
Lear consented to a post-signing market check. The court found the deal
protections reasonable:
The go-shop period was truncated and left a bidder hard-pressed to
do adequate due diligence, present a topping bid with a full-blown
draft merger agreement, have the Lear board make the required
decision to declare the new bid a superior offer, wait Icahn's ten-
day period to match, and then have the Lear board accept that bid,
terminate its agreement with Icahn, and "substantially concurrently"
enter into a merger agreement with it.1
98
All of these events had to occur within the 45 day window, but a
ravenous bidder could do this. 1'99 The court found that the 3.52% termi-
nation fee was reasonable because it was not of a level that would deter
a serious bid. 20 0 The court treated Icahn's matching rights similarly,
stating that they were hardly novel and had been upheld even when
coupled with termination fees.2'
In Lear, the court helped the board to find an excuse for not getting
the best value for the shareholders. It mentioned the appraisal rights for
those shareholders who did not think the price was high enough.20 2
The court used emergency reasoning to justify deal protections:
"Icahn was tying up $1.4 billion in capital to make a bid for a
corporation in a troubled industry .... Exigent circumstances, as
explained later, were cited as an additional reason to depart from
Omnicare in the J.P. Morgan-Bear Steams and Wells Fargo-Wachovia
deals.2°4
Lear limited Topps back to the Toys "'R" Us standard and even
went beyond. If the shareholders thought the company was worth more,
197. Cf supra Part III.C.
198. InreLear, 926 A.2dat 119.
199. Id. at 119-20.
200. Id. at 120.
201. Id. at 120 n,21.
202. Id. at 122.
203. Id. at 120.
204. See infra Parts II.G-H.
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they could seek appraisal instead of accusing the board of non-
compliance with its Revlon duties. The court in Lear showed great
deference to the board's business logic and business judgment.
"Reasonableness, not perfection, measured in business terms relevant to
value creation, rather than by what creates the most sterile smell, is the
,,205
metric.
E. Optima International of Miami v. WCI Steel
1. Factual Background and Holding
In the end of 2007, WCI Steel, Inc. was a troubled steel company
owned by 28 stockholders, two of which controlled a majority of the
outstanding voting power. Severe liquidity problems had put WCI
under great pressure either to sell the company or to face a bankruptcy
liquidation.0 6 WCI was operating under a collective bargaining agree-
ment, which gave the United Steelworkers Union a veto right over any
change-of-control transaction. 27 By April 2008, two potential bidders
emerged: OAO Severstal and Optima International of Miami, Inc.
208
The Union decided to support Severstal and Severstal submitted a bid in
the amount of $101 million. In the bidding war with Optima, Severstal
raised its bid to $140 million, but conditioned it on the board acting
immediately to approve the deal and to obtain stockholder authorization.
The board accepted the Severstal offer, a merger agreement was signed
and within a few minutes two majority stockholders signed written
consents thereby providing the requisite stockholder approval of the
merger.209 Optima had a standstill agreement with WCI, from which
WCI refused to release it.
210
Optima sought to enjoin the Severstal merger, arguing that the WCI
board had violated its duties under Omnicare by contracting away its
fiduciary-out by seeking and obtaining stockholder approval imme-
diately rather than seeking to keep the bidding process alive. Optima
argued, relying on Topps, that the WCI refusal to release it from the
205. See In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 118.
206. Optima Transcript, supra note 2, at 119-20.
207. Id. at 118-19.
208. Id. at 120-21.
209. Id. at 133-37.
210. Id. at 128.
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standstill agreement was a breach of fiduciary duty. 211
The Delaware Chancery Court refused to enjoin the merger. The
court held that the board's action in obtaining nearly immediate
stockholder approval did not impermissibly lock-up the deal. "The
stockholder vote, although quickly taken, was simply the next step in the
transaction as contemplated by the statute. Nothing in the DGCL
requires any particular period of time between a board's authorization of
a merger agreement and the necessary stockholder vote., 21 2 The court
held that the board did not breach its Revlon duties in agreeing to the
Severstal merger rather than continuing to negotiate with Optima, which
actually had a higher, though more conditional, bid on the table. "The
board ... exercised a very thorough judgment .. ,,2 Regarding the
standstill agreement with Optima, the court held that the board had a
reasonable basis not to allow a higher bidder to directly approach the
stockholders: it made a business decision that waiving the standstill
agreement would have merely threatened litigation with the Union.
14
2. Revlon Scrutiny Limited to the Board's Business Judgment
Optima v. WCI established that, notwithstanding Omnicare, the
board and the majority stockholders were allowed to act definitively to
sign up and consummate a deal that was, in the board's judgment, in the
best interests of the stockholders. The court upheld board action
approving a transaction where "a clear majority [of the stockholders]
were in favor of the board acting in such a way as to be sure not to lose
the Severstal bid., 21 5  This position directly refers to the approach
advocated by the dissenting judges in Omnicare.21 6
The shareholder approval of the Severstal merger was secured via
written consents of the majority shareholders. This mechanism in fact
equals to the cumulative effect of the Omnicare's voting agreements
paired with the "force-the-vote" provision in the merger agreement. The
court, however, held that that written consents are "not like the lockup in
Omnicare.
'
,
217
211. Id.
212. Id. at 127.
213. Id. at 138.
214. Id. at 128-29.
215. Id. at 133.
216. Cf supra Part I.C.
217. Optima Transcript, supra note 2, at 127.
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The court found that the board weighed all the risks associated with
the different offers then available and concluded that it was appropriate
to approve the Severstal merger. The board had decided that it was
better for stockholders "to take Severstal's lower-but-more-certain bid
than Optima's higher-but-more-risky bid." '18 The court declared: "I
don't substitute my judgment for that of the board or my business
judgment for the board's judgment. My job is to look at what the
directors did and determine whether the actions they took are within a
range of reasonableness., 2 '9 This case clearly evidences more judicial
deference to the board's business judgment, even with regard to the
Optima standstill agreement, which WCI refused to lift.
The court indicated that it was sensitive to the WCI liquidity
problems and that it was unclear whether Optima would be able to
consummate the transaction as a result of the Union's opposition. These
external pressures on the board also supported greater court deference to
the board business judgment.
F. Ryan v. Lyondell
This deal - a cash-for-stock merger between Basell AF, a privately
held Luxemburg company, and Lyondell Chemical Company - led to a
long litigation, in which both the Delaware Chancery Court and the
Delaware Supreme Court had a chance to examine the merits.
1. Factual Background and Holding
Lyondell was approached by Basell with an all-cash merger
proposal. Lyondell's Chairman and CEO was able to raise Basell's offer
from the initial $40 to $48 per share.220 Basell dropped a financing
contingency in the merger agreement, but required that Lyondell sign a
merger agreement within one week. 22' Lyondell's board considered
Basell's offer at four special meetings, which lasted for a total of seven
hours, and consented to the merger. The merger agreement contained a
no-shop provision, subject to a fiduciary-out, matching rights for Basell
and a $385 million termination fee; a go-shop provision was requested
218. Id.
219. Id. at 138.
220. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105,
at *22 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008).
221. Id. at **22-23.
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by the Lyondell board, but was rejected by Basell. Lyondell's board
pulled the poison pill with respect to the Basell proposal.222
Some shareholders challenged the merger and, in particular, used
the Unocal/Unitrin test to contest the deal protections. They argued that
the deal protections, acting in concert, precluded other bids for the
company, which, in turn, coerced Lyondell shareholders to accept the
Basell proposal. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the directors,
under Revlon, acted unreasonably by granting considerable deal
protections to Basell, which rendered the Basell merger afait accompli.
It was claimed that the directors failed to obtain the best available price
in selling the company and therefore breached their duty of loyalty by
failing to act in good faith.
The limits of a summary judgment motion did not allow the
Delaware Chancery Court to decide the ultimate issue of the
reasonableness of deal protection provisions in the merger agreement,
due to unresolved questions of fact,223 and the Chancery Court denied
the summary judgment motion as to the deal protection invalidity
claims. However, the court made some observations that are important
to this Essay. It analyzed the merger agreement and the deal protections
under both the Revlon and Unocal standards. The court announced that
after trial it might be satisfied that the board undertook to discharge its
Revlon duties in good faith under the circumstances, in this case the
board's decision to accede to this particular mix of deal protections
would be deemed reasonable.224 The court stated that, under the
Orman!Williams coerciveness principle, the deal protections and other
provisions in the Basell merger agreement did not have the effect of
causing the shareholders to vote in favor of the Basell transaction for
225
reasons other than its merits.
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed. It held that the directors
were disinterested and independent, generally aware of the company's
value and its prospects and had reason to believe that no other bidders
would emerge, given the price Basell had offered and the limited
universe of companies that might be interested in acquiring Lyondell's
unique assets. The directors negotiated the price up and considered the
offer under the time constraints imposed by the buyer, with the
222. Id. at *31.
223. Id. at *83.
224. Id.
225. Id. at **76-77.
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assistance of financial and legal advisors. "There is no evidence that the
directors knowingly ignored their responsibilities, thereby breaching
their duty of loyalty. Accordingly, the directors were entitled to the
entry of summary judgment. 226
2. Lyondell Total Deference Standard
In Ryan v. Lyondell the Delaware Chancery Court analyzed the deal
protection devices in a Revlon transaction under both the
Unocal/Unitrin and Revlon standards. The court stated:
One might read Omnicare to suggest that deal protection measures
must withstand the enhanced judicial scrutiny test prescribed by
Unocal. The better reading of Omnicare, however, is that the
Delaware Supreme Court reconfirmed that enhanced judicial
scrutiny, regardless of the particular analytical framework, is the
appropriate test for this Court to apply when reviewing a board's
decision to grant deal protections. Unocal is but one formulation of
enhanced scrutiny that might be applied; it is not, however, the only
test, nor is it necessarily appropriate in all circumstances. Thus,
Omnicare did not mark an analytical sea change; instead, it is
consistent with numerous cases in which this Court has carefully
scrutinized a board's decision to grant deal protections before
according it the deference normally given to directors' business
decisions.
2 2 7
The Delaware Chancery Court required for deal protections just
some enhanced judicial scrutiny, regardless of a particular formal
standard. This rejection of the traditional post-Omnicare dichotomy:
Unocal analysis for non-Revlon transactions vs. QVC "range of
reasonableness" analysis for Revlon transactions - supports the total
deference to the directors' business judgment. When reasonableness is
"measured in business terms relevant to value creation,, 221 it becomes
very similar to the "laxer standard of rationality review applicable under
the business judgment rule. 229
Under previous decisions (Toys "R" Us, Topps, Lear), an active
market check, either pre-signing or post-signing, performed through the
226. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 237 (Del. 2009).
227. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105,
at *75 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008).
228. In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 118 (Del. Ch. 2007).
229. In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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solicitation of potential bidders, was required for the board to be found
to have acted reasonably in undertaking a sale of the company.230 The
Delaware Supreme Court decision in Ryan v. Lyondell eliminated the
(active) market check requirement altogether - neither a pre-signing nor
a post-signing active market check is now required. There is only one
Revlon duty - to get the best deal for the shareholders at a sale of the
company. "No court can tell directors exactly how to accomplish that
goal, because they will be facing a unique combination of
circumstances, many of which will be outside their control., 23 1 It is
wrong for a court to suggest to the board which steps to take to satisfy
its Revlon duties - by engaging actively in the sale process, by
conducting an auction, by conducting a market check or by
demonstrating "an impeccable knowledge of the market.,
23 2
G. Bear Stearns Shareholder Litigation
233
1. Factual Background and Holdina
In March 2008, The Bear Steams Companies Inc., a leading
investment banking firm, faced first a liquidity crisis and later a
bankruptcy risk. The Federal Reserve and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., a
global financial services firm, with the support of the U.S. Department
of the Treasury, agreed to provide emergency funding to Bear Steams
and on March 24, 2008 a stock-for-stock merger between J.P. Morgan
and Bear Steams with an implied value of $10 per share and a related
share exchange agreement was announced.234 The merger agreement
contained an asset option (an option to purchase Bear Steams' corporate
headquarters in New York for $1.1 billion, exercisable within 120 days
after Bear Steams shareholders had voted down the merger agreement),
and a no-shop clause, subject to a fiduciary-out.235 Under the terms of
230. See supra Parts IH.B-D.
231. Lyondell Chem. Co., 970 A.2d at 242.
232. Id. at 243 (citing Ryan, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *19).
233. Both J.P. Morgan's government-supported acquisition of Bear Steams and
Wells Fargo's acquisition of Wachovia (see infra Part III.H) were struck amidst
financial turmoil. The emergency argument has been increasingly used by the courts to
justify their business judgment deference when reviewing deal protection devices in
non-Revlon transactions.
234. In re Bear Steams Litig., 870 N.Y.S.2d 709, 723 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
235. Id. at 722-23.
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the share exchange agreement, J.P. Morgan was to purchase 39.5% of
Bear Steams' common stock for $2 per share.2 36
Bear Steams shareholders challenged the J.P. Morgan merger
agreement alleging that the proposed merger was at an inadequate price
and was approved by the Bear Steams directors in breach of their
fiduciary duties. The plaintiffs argued that the board impermissibly
allowed the incorporation of a combination of onerous and coercive deal
protection devices into the merger agreement, which disenfranchised the
shareholders. 37
The Supreme Court of New York238 decided the case applying
Delaware law. It held that the Unocal, Revlon and Blasius 23 9 enhanced
scrutiny did not apply and that deal protection measures were valid
under the business judgment rule. 4°
2. Bear Stearns Standard: Business Judgment Rule for
Deal Protection Devices in a Non-Revlon Transaction
The J.P. Morgan/Bear Steams deal's unprecedented deal protection
measures - especially the 39.5% share exchange agreement - would
probably be invalid under Unocal/Unitrin, as they rendered Bear Steams
shareholders' approval rights entirely illusory.24' The asset option was
236. Id. at 732.
237. Id. at 730.
238. The Delaware Chancery Court abstained from ruling in the shareholder
litigation, taking advantage of a pending New York action to stay the Delaware lawsuit.
See In re Bear Steams Cos., Inc., In re S'holder Litig. Consolidated C.A. No. 3643-
VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46, at *29 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2008). Kahan and Rock called
this move "strategic use of comity." See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How
to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the
Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713 (2009).
239. The court limited the application of Blasius only to director election contests.
See In re Bear Stearns Cos. S'holder Litig., 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46, at **20-21. Cf
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
240. In re Bear Steams Litig., 870 N.Y.S.2d 709, 730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
241. Cf Kahan & Rock, supra note 238, at 713, 721-38. See also Mark J. Roe,
Delaware and Washington as Corporate Dealmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 14 (2009)
("That high a level of deal protection would not ordinarily fly under Delaware law...
."). J.P. Morgan purchased 10% of the outstanding shares on the open market;
therefore, it held altogether 49.5% of Bear Steams shares. See In re Bear Stearns Litig.,
870 N.Y.S.2d at 724. Although this missed by 0.5% the formal majority threshold, J.P.
Morgan effectively controlled the shareholder vote. Cf Kahan & Rock, at 729 ("Any
notion that the deal was not locked up by March 24-because J.P. Morgan's ownership
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primarily directed at shielding the merger from the shareholders, which
would vote down the deal and take their chances at the company's
property if Bear Steams were liquidated. This was a rare case of a
crown jewel lockup, after these were invalidated in Revlon and in Mills
Acquisition v. Macmillan.242
The court held that neither enhanced scrutiny standard was
applicable to deal protection devices. There was no evidence that the
board acted out of self-interest or in bad faith. "The board's efforts to
preserve some shareholder value while averting the uncertainty of a
bankruptcy - an event with potentially cataclysmic consequences for the
broader economy as well as for the shareholders - would survive
scrutiny even if some enhanced standard of review under Delaware law
did apply." 243  Under the Revlon test, Bear Steams directors acted
reasonably because they were "sophisticated and knowledgeable about
the industry and strategic alternatives available to the company; were
involved in the negotiation process and bargained hard; relied on expert
advice; and received a fairness opinion from a financial advisor."
' 44
Under the Unocal test, the liquidity crisis threatened Bear Stearns with
extinction and the directors' response was proportionate to the threat as
Bear Steams' very survival "depended on consummating a transaction
with a financially sound partner., 245 However, "[h]eightened scrutiny of
the merger protection provisions is simply not warranted in the instant
case." 246 Revlon is not applicable, as "JPMorgan... did not become a
majority shareholder .... [and] the public shareholders retained ultimate
control. 247 "Unocal is inapplicable in a case where the board initiates
the transaction in the absence of. . ." a hostile third party threat to
corporate control.248  "Inasmuch as, none of the enhanced standards
apply, the deal protection measures are reviewable only under the
business judgment rule. 249
was below 50% and there was a hypothetical possibility that the shareholders would not
approve the deal-flies in the face of both reality as well as the careful, contextual
analysis performed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unitrin.").
242. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
243. In re Bear Stearns, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
244. Id. at 732.
245. Id. at 731.
246. Id. at 734.
247. Id. at 733-34.
248. Id. at 733.
249. Id. at 734.
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The court excluded application of the Unocal test to deal protection
devices. The court expressly stated that Unocal was inapplicable to deal
protection devices in the absence of a hostile third party threat.250
Therefore, the court altogether rejected Omnicare with its application of
the Unocal test to deal protection devices. To support its holding that
the deal protection measures are reviewable under the business judgment
rule, the court referred to the pre-Omnicare cases: IXC and Bartlett,21 as
if no Omnicare ruling existed.
The application of the business judgment rule to the deal
protections was warranted mainly by the "very real emergency which
the company faced.. ,,212 "The financial catastrophe confronting Bear
Steams, and the economy generally, justified the inclusion of the various
merger protection provisions intended to increase the certainty of the
consummation of the transaction with J.P. Morgan. ' ' 25 3  Due to an
emergency situation, the court did not insist on any market check and
endorsed strong deal protections.
H. Ehrenhaus v. Baker
1. Factual Background and Holding
During the financial storm of 2008, on September 25, 2008, the
"death knell . . .began sounding" 254 for Wachovia Corporation, large
financial cervices company. Facing significant downward market
pressure on the company's share price following these events, the
Wachovia senior management began vetting merger suitors. 5  Wells
Fargo & Company and Citigroup, Inc. quickly emerged as potential
merger partners. On September 29, 2008, Citigroup and Wachovia
signed (what Wachovia characterized as a non-binding) agreement to
acquire Wachovia's banking subsidiaries.256 On October 2, 2008, Wells
Fargo tendered a competing merger proposal to acquire all of
250. Id. at 733.
251. See supra note 65.
252. In re Bear Stearns, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
253. Id. at 735.
254. Ehrenhaus v. Baker, Civil Action No. 08 CVS 22632, 2008 NCBC LEXIS 20,
at *10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 2008).
255. Id.at*ll.
256. Ebrenhaus v. Baker, Civil Action No. 08 CVS 22632, 2008 NCBC LEXIS 21,
at *49. (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008).
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Wachovia's assets. Next day, after being advised that the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation was prepared to place Wachovia into
receivership if a merger did not materialize with either Citigroup or
Wells Fargo, the Wachovia board approved the Wells Fargo proposal.257
The merger agreement contemplated a stock-for-stock transaction. The
merger agreement did not allow the Wachovia board to withdraw from
the merger should a third party offer a higher bid; instead, the board was
required to put the matter to a shareholder vote. The merger agreement
also prohibited Wachovia from soliciting alternative acquisition
proposals.258 In conjunction with the merger, a separate share exchange
agreement granted Wells Fargo 39.9% of Wachovia aggregated voting
rights (the original proposal required a transfer of more than 50% of the
total voting power, but the Wachovia board negotiated this down to
39.9%).259 Wachovia was prohibited from redeeming those shares for
18 months following a vote on the merger agreement, even if the merger
was not consummated.26°
The shareholders of Wachovia claimed that the board of directors
breached its fiduciary duties to the company's shareholders when they
approved the Wells Fargo merger. The plaintiffs claimed that the
transfer of almost 40% of Wachovia's aggregate voting rights to Wells
Fargo pursuant to the share exchange was unduly coercive, effectively
disenfranchised public shareholders and precluded any competing bid
for the company.261
The North Carolina Superior Court applied North Carolina law and
"look[ed] to Delaware for guidance on questions of corporate
governance because of the special expertise and body of case law
developed in the Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme
Court., 262 The court held that, as long as the decision to include the deal
protection measures in the merger agreement was informed, was made
in good faith and with an honest belief that the action was in the best
interests of the company and its shareholders, the board's business
judgment 263 would not be disturbed by the courts absent proof by clear
257. Id. at **69-70.
258. Id. at *55.
259. Id. at *61 n.14.
260. Id. at *2.
261. Id. at*81.
262. Id. at *90 n.19.
263. The court referred to the opinion in Hammonds v. Lumbee River Elec.
Membership Corp., 631 S.E.2d 1, 20-21 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006), for formulation of the
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and convincing evidence of interference with shareholder voting rights
or statutory duties:
264
If [a shareholder] fails to prove a breach of duty, the action of the
directors [of a corporation] is entitled to a strong presumption of
reasonableness and validity, including noncoercion, and the court
should not intervene unless the shareholder can rebut that
presumption by clear and convincing evidence that the deal
protection provisions were actionably coercive, or that the deal
protection provisions prevented the directors from performing their
statutory duties. 
265
Only with regard to the 18 months limitation on the board's ability
to redeem the shares that gave Wells Fargo 39.9% of Wachovia's total
voting power, the court concluded that this provision prevented the
board from fulfilling its fiduciary duties and was invalid.266
2. Wachovia Standard: Business Judgment Rule for
Deal Protection Devices in a Non-Revlon Transaction
Under Omnicare, the deal protection devices in a non-Revlon
transaction should be subject to the Unocal test. However, absent
coerciveness, the court in this case deferred to the board's business
judgment.
The Wells Fargo merger agreement contained strong deal
protection provisions. More than 40%267 voting power in Wells Fargo,
although not representing an absolute majority of the votes required for
approval of the merger agreement, effectively locked up the shareholder
vote. Wells Fargo's shareholder vote lockup in conjunction with the
"force-the-vote" provision in the merger agreement made an alternative
deal "mathematically impossible," in Omnicare terms. The court held,
however, that "a majority of Wachovia shareholders (owning nearly
60% of all Wachovia shares) 'may still freely vote for or against the
merger, based on their own perceived best interests, and ultimately
business judgment rule under North Carolina law.
264. Ehrenhaus, 2008 NCBC LEXIS 21, at *100 (citing First Union Corp. v.
Suntrust Banks, Inc., 2001 NCBC 9A, 72 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2001).
265. Id. at *101 (citing First Union, 2001 NCBC 9A, 70).
266. Id. at **159-62.
267. Wells Fargo also held 32,883,669 shares of Wachovia, which, together with
those shares obtained under the shares exchange agreement, amounted to 40.8% of the
Wachovia's total voting power. See Ehrenhaus, 2008 NCBC LEXIS 21, at *78 n. 18.
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defeat the merger, if they desire' ' 268 and that the share exchange
agreement did nor preclude other bidders coming forward.269
The court pointed out that Wachovia board was confronted with
extraordinary circumstances: 270 the case was unique due to the "presence
of the 800-pound gorilla in the Wachovia board room, in the form of the
U.S. government's pervasive regulatory oversight over bank holding
companies. ' ' 271 The threat of government intervention, in the form of a
forced liquidation of the company's banking assets, weighed heavily on
the board as it considered the Wells Fargo merger agreement. All these
factors justified business judgment deference: "directors often make
important decisions under fluid and uncertain circumstances and that a
court must be loathe to review such judgments on the basis of ex post
judicial hindsight., 27 2
I. Synthesizing Post-Omnicare Cases on Deal Protection Devices
Omnicare established the following dichotomy with regard to the
standard of review of deal protection provisions in a merger agreement:
in a Revlon-transaction, the QVC "range of reasonableness" test is
applicable, whereas in a non-Revlon transaction the Unocal/Unitrin two-
step analysis applies. This dichotomy has been effectively changing
through the post-Omnicare jurisprudence to the directors' business
judgment deference for deal protections in both Revlon and non-Revlon
transactions.
When no change of control is involved in a corporate acquisition
transaction, a court will review the deal protection devices under the
traditional business judgment rule (Bear Stearns and Ehrenhaus v.
Baker). Unless the procedural presumption of the business judgment
rule is rebutted, a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
board if the board's decision can be attributed to any rational business
268. Ehrenhaus v. Baker, Civil Action No. 08 CVS 22632, 2008 NCBC LEXIS 21,
at *142 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008) (citing In re IXC Communications, Inc.
S'holders Litig., Consolidated C.A. No. 17324, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210, at *23 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 27, 1999)).
269. Id.
270. The court referred to the Bear Stearns opinion of its New York colleague, in
which the court stated that "[t]he financial catastrophe confronting Bear Steams, and the
economy generally, justified the inclusion of the various merger protection provisions..
" See id. at *121.
271. Id.at*122.
272. Id.at*117.
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purpose.273 In Bear Stearns the court expressly stated that Unocal
analysis is not applicable to deal protections, this test is only for hostile
takeover battles. Only in Orman v. Cullman the court applied to deal
protection devices the Unocal test, although coerciveness was denied.
Written consents given by the majority shareholders have been explicitly
endorsed in Orman v. Cullman.
In determining whether the deal protections are within a "range of
reasonableness" in a Revlon transaction, courts usually weigh such
considerations as how early in the negotiation process the deal
protections were given and the value-enhancing nature of their specific
terms. "Standard deal protection that the board grants after completing.
. [some form of a market check will] survive heightened review under
Revlon/QVC, while a similar option[s] granted very early in the process
are more susceptible to an ex post attack"27 4 (Toys "R'" Us, Topps,
Lear). In practice, post-signing market checks, most notably go-shop
provisions, have been developed in response to bidders who insisted on
absence of any pre-signing market check. Courts have endorsed post-
signing market checks, although they are weaker and effectively allow
for utilizing stronger deal protections (Topps, Lear). As a further step,
courts allow the boards to skip any active market check if they can
demonstrate thorough knowledge of the market (Ryan v. Lyondell).
Since Toys "R" Us, absent some entrenchment motivation, the courts,
applying the Revlon test, have been giving to target board actions more
business logic deference. Later they even recognized that directors can
put aside conflicts arising from working on both sides of a deal (Lear).
The board can refuse to lift a standstill agreement with the unwanted
bidder and by doing this preclude such bidder from directly approaching
the shareholders if it has reasonable grounds for doing so (Optima v.
WC1). Courts even helped the board to find an excuse for non-
compliance with its Revlon duties: they mentioned appraisal rights
(Lear).
In emergency situations, when the target board faces an extreme
liquidity crisis as a result of "unprecedented financial tsunami, 275 the
deference to directors' business judgment is even stronger (Bear
Stearns, Ehrenhaus v. Baker). This emergency exception applies not
273. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
274. Cf ALLEN ET AL., supra note 18, at 583 (emphasis added).
275. Ehrenhaus v. Baker, Civil Action No. 08 CVS 22632, 2008 NCBC LEXIS 21,
at *131 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008) (emphasis omitted).
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only to government-supported deals. It can effectively limit the Revlon
enhanced review to the business judgment deference in purely private
deals (Lear, Optima v. WC1).
IV. CONCLUSION
Subsequent case law shows that over time courts have been
narrowing the holding in Omnicare. They have been expanding the
statement made in Omnicare that "[a]ny board has authority to give the
proponent of a recommended merger agreement reasonable structural
and economic defenses, incentives, and fair compensation if the
transaction is not completed. 276 In addition, in the recent government-
supported deals the limits of deal protection devices have been stretched
and the courts in New York and North Carolina have followed the
tendency which seems to have been established for private deals in
Delaware. It remains to be seen how soon Omnicare will be formally
overturned.277
276. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 938.
277. Cf. Subramanian, supra note 124, at 758 n.118 ("[T]he change in the
membership of the Delaware Supreme Court since the Omnicare decision suggests that
an explicit reversal is no implausible.").
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